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CANDOR OR SHAME?
DEFINING OBSCENITY
BY STATUTE*
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
N 1960, Field and Stream Magazine contained a book review of
D. H. Lawrence's controversial work Lady Chatterley's Lover.
The reviewer concisely summarized the novel with the comment:
This fictional account of the day-by-day life of an English gamekeeper
is still of considerable interest to outdoor minded readers, as it cer-
tainly contains many passages on pheasant raising, and apprehending
of poachers, ways to control vermin and other chores and duties of
the professional gamekeeper. Unfortunately, one is obliged to wade
through many pages of extraneous material in order to discover and
savor these sidelights on the management of a midland shooting
estate. In this reviewer's opinion, this book cannot take the place
of J. R. Miller's PRACTICAL GAMEKEEPER.
However, New York sports enthusiasts wishing to judge the compara-
tive merits of Miller and Lawrence were prohibited from purchasing
this novel prior to 1960 by the decision of the New York City
Postmaster. He banned the book from the mails on the grounds that
it was
replete with descriptions in minute detail of sexual acts engaged in
or discussed by the book's principal characters. These descriptions
utilize filthy, offensive and degrading words and terms. Any literary
merit the book may have is far outweighed by the pornographic and
smutty passages and words, so that the book, taken as a whole,
is an obscene and filthy work. (Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,
276 F.2d 434.)
The ban on sale of the novel was removed following a decision of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, upheld
by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (Grove Press,
Inc. v. Christenberry, supra), declaring the book was not obscene.
* Compiled by Sandra Edhlund, Research Analyst, Legislative Reference Bureau,
Madison, Wis. Informational Bulletin 66-73, August 1966.
The varying opinions displayed by a
sportswriter, postmaster and several
judges concerning a single novel empha-
size the vagueness of the term "obscenity"
and the difficulty of applying the term to
specific works. As one man's pornog-
raphy may be another's artistic master-
piece, devising a clear and concise def-
inition by which to judge obscene content
is clearly difficult. However, the general-
ly prevailing community opinion in the
United States appears to favor some con-
trol of pornographic materials, and both
lawmakers and judges are faced with the
task of devising such a definition to pro-
tect the public from grossly pornographic
materials without stifling artistic expres-
sion or violating the First Amendment
right of free expression.
JUDICIAL TESTS AND
DEFINITIONS
Defining the obscene has been histor-
ically a judicial rather than a legislative
problem. Early statutory prohibitions on
obscene or pornographic literature con-
tained vague descriptions of obscene ma-
terials as those which would tend to cor-
rupt youth. No further criterion was set
by statute, and determination of corrup-
tive tendencies was left completely to the
courts. For over one hundred years
judges have sought general rules by which
to determine pornographic content. Sev-
eral major tests have been devised during
this period.
The Hicklin Rule
The earliest U.S. court test for ob-
scenity was devised in England by Sir
Alexander Cockburn in Regina v. Hicklin
(1868), L.R. 3 Q.B. 360. Basically, the
decision stated that a publication could
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be deemed obscene if any portion of it
tended to exert a corrupting influence on
the most easily susceptible elements in
the society. Generally, the most easily
corruptible element used for this test was
youth, and materials could be determined
obscene if any portion would tend to
corrupt youth. Although several lower
courts in the United States disputed the
legitimacy of this test, the Hicklin rule
was used in determining obscenity for
most of the century until the United
States Supreme Court curtailed the prac-
tice by a decision in 1957. The case
which finally contested the legality of the
Hicklin rule was Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380 (1957). The United States
Supreme Court struck down a Michigan
statute based on the Hicklin test, stating
that it did so because the statute curtailed
the rights of due process. According to
the court, by not limiting the legislation
reasonably to the evil with which it was
intended to deal, the law forced the adult
population of Michigan to read only what
was fit for children. Having struck down
the traditional test for obscenity, the Su-
preme Court in the same year accepted
a new one, in Roth v. United States and
Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
The Roth Test
In Roth, supra, the Supreme Court
faced squarely for the first time the ques-
tion of conflict between prohibiting ob-
scene publications and guaranteeing the
First Amendment right of free expression.
The court stated that obscenity is exclud-
ed from the protection of the First
Amendment.
All ideas having even the slightest re-
deeming social importance-unorthodox
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ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-have the full protection of the
guaranties. . . . But implicit in the his-
tory of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance.
Also the court approved the jury in-
structions given in the trial court, as a
legitimate test for obscenity.
'The test is not whether it would arouse
sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts
in those comprising a particular segment
of the community, the young, the im-
mature or the highly prudish or would
leave another segment, the scientific or
highly educated or the so-called worldly-
wise and sophisticated indifferent and
unmoved. .
'The test in each case is the effect of the
book, picture or publication considered as
a whole, not upon any particular class,
but upon all those whom it is likely to
reach. In other words, you determine its
impact upon the average person in the
community. The books, pictures and cir-
culars must be judged as a whole, in their
entire context, and you are not to con-
sider detached or separate portions in
reaching a conclusion. You judge the
circulars, pictures and publications which
have been put in evidence by present-
day standards of the community. You
may ask yourselves does it offend the
common conscience of the community by
present-day standards.'
The general criteria varied from the
Hicklin test in several important ways.
Rather than the consideration of specific
portions of the material, the test was now
to view the dominant theme of the whole.
Material was to be viewed as to its effect
on the mind of the average member of
the community, rather than on that of
the most susceptible.
Recent Obscenity Cases
Since the Roth decision, several ques-
tions have been raised concerning the new
definition. Basically, they derive from the
vagueness of the criteria. What commu-
nity standards are to be used? Are they
the standards of the nation, state, local
community or particular social segment
of the local community, i.e., sexual de-
viants, religious sects, etc.? How influen-
tial is the stipulation on redeeming social
importance? Must all material having
some social importance be exempt from
judgment or does a judgment that such
material is obscene infer that it is with-
out redeeming social importance and is,
therefore, excluded from protection of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments? If
the publication is to be considered as a
whole, can illustrations be judged pruri-
ent without considering the text? How
much weight can be given to the manner
of sale or to the motives of the seller?
Is prurient interest enough to bring a
judgment of obscenity, or must the work
be patently offensive as well? Unfortun-
ately, the Supreme Court has not an-
swered these questions by setting forth
further strong precedents in this area.
Three cases before the court in 1966
show a great division in the court on the
questions raised by Roth.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966), the majority held that John
Cleland's novel, Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure, commonly known as Fanny
Hill, was not obscene. Six justices con-
curred in this decision but based their
agreement on 3 separate opinions. Jus-
tices Warren, Brennan and Fortas con-
curred in the majority opinion, holding
that a publication could be judged ob-
scene only if all 3 elements of the Roth
test-patent offensiveness to community
standards, dominance of a theme appeal-
ing to the prurient interest and lack of
any redeeming social importance-were
shown to exist in the publication. Fanny
Hill might be both patently offensive and
appealing to the prurient interest, but be-
cause it was considered to have some
social importance, it could not be banned
as an obscene publication. Foreshadow-
ing the opinion in Ginzburg v. United
States, the 3 justices also concluded that
in the case of a publication such as Fan-
ny Hill, having minimal social importance
and maximum prurient appeal and patent
offensiveness, the manner of sale would
be a relevant factor in deciding whether
or not the publication was obscene. How-
ever, in this particular case, evidence re-
lating to manner of sale had not been
brought out in the trial court.
In a separate opinion, Justice Stewart
concurred on the grounds that Fanny
Hill was not "hard core" pornography,
that "hard core" pornography is that in
which the elements of patent offensive-
ness, appeal to prurient interest and no
redeeming social importance coalesce,
and that it is only such "hard core"
pornography which it is the function of
government to suppress.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred
in the decision, relying on the argument
they had originally set forth in Roth, that
the First Amendment means exactly what
it says, that "Congress shall make no law
abridging freedom of speech or
press." Accordingly Congress should be
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restricted from enacting legislation which
impedes free expression of any idea, ob-
scene or not. They also argue that the
Fourteenth Amendment makes the pro-
visions of the First applicable to the
states as well as the federal government,
and therefore both state and federal laws
banning obscene publications are uncon-
stitutional.
The dissenters were no more harmoni-
ous, each issuing a separate opinion. To
Justice Clark, the redeeming social im-
portance of the work was not a consid-
eration. According to him, the Roth case
held that only 2 constitutional tests, pa-
tent offensiveness to community standards
and appeal to prurient interest were to
be applied to determine obscenity. In a
separate opinion, Justice White agreed
with Justice Clark that Roth does not in-
clude the test of redeeming social import-
ance. Justice Harlan would apply a dif-
ferent constitutional standard to regulation
of obscenity by states than to regulation
by the federal government. He argued
that the federal government should
be interested in restricting only "hard
core" pornography from the mails, but
the states, responsible for regulating the
public welfare, had a greater legitimate
interest in controlling obscenity. The
Fourteenth Amendment, in his view, lim-
ited the states by demanding that states
use rationally applied criteria for such
regulation, but it did not apply to the
states the stringent constitutional controls
which the First Amendment applied to
Congress.
Mishkin v. New York
While the Memoirs case demonstrated
the lack of agreement in the court con-
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cerning the proper criteria for testing ob-
scenity, Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966), raised another point of dis-
pute, that of the community to which
materials must be patently offensive and
pruriently appealing. In this case, the
publications had been expressly printed
for and distributed to a clearly defined,
sexually deviant group. While such pub-
lications would raise disgust rather than
prurient interest in the general commu-
nity, it was decided that if the material
was designed for and primarily dissem-
inated to a clearly defined group of sex-
ual deviants, the prurient appeal test
could be based on the appeal such ma-
terials had for the particular group to
which it was directed. This time, the
majority opinion was supported by 5 jus-
tices, with Justice Harlan concurring and
Black, Douglas and Stewart dissenting for
the reasons they had set out in Memoirs,
supra.
Ginzburg v. United States
The most publicized case in this group
-and the one which added a new prece-
dent-was Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966). How firm a pre-
cedent this decision will set is question-
able in light of its being a 5 to 4 decision,
with a fairly vigorous dissent apparent.
The case concerned publications which
were distributed through the mails by
Ralph Ginzburg and for which he was
charged with violating the United States
obscenity statute. The court upheld his
conviction not by judging the mailed ma-
terials as obscene in themselves, but by
considering the manner of sale and type
of publicity used to advertise the pub-
lications. If the selling techniques used
appealed to the prurient interest and ex-
ploited such interest, the actions of a
person engaged in such exploitation could
be seen as a violation of the federal ob-
scenity law.
Once again, the dissenting opinions
were varied. Justice Douglas dissented
again on the grounds that the First
Amendment did not permit censorship of
an expression of ideas. Justice Black
concurred in this opinion but added that
the majority opinion allowed for an un-
constitutionally vague interpretation of
what constituted a crime under the ob-
scenity law. Justice Harlan dissented
both because the statute was vague and
because the material considered was not
what he would term "hard core" porn-
ography. Justice Stewart agreed with
Harlan but further criticized the majority
opinion, which condemned Ginzburg for
his "sordid business," as an arbitrary and
unjudicial move by the court.
Quite obviously, opinions of the court
in these cases show the court to be in a
state of evident confusion in its attempt
to devise standards and rational criteria
for judging obscenity. The variety of
opinions which have been set forth, the
various directions taken in search of cri-
teria, the problems over the real meaning
of the Roth criteria, all have direct bear-
ing on the lawmaker in his efforts to
devise statutory definitions for the ob-
scene. Since Michigan's statute was de-
clared unconstitutional in 1957, many
states have reconsidered their own ob-
scenity statutes. States seeking to ban
obscene publications are obliged to devise
legislation which is both effective and in
keeping with the ever-changing require-
ments set by an indefinite court.
STATE OBSCENITY STATUTES
Obscene publications are prohibited by
law in most of the states. Only New
Mexico does not have statutory prohibi-
tions, and it does have provisions allow-
ing municipalities to restrict publications
considered obscene. Generally, state
statutes relating to obscene publications
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fall into several distinct categories and
there is little variance among the statutes
within each category. The following table
shows the type of defining technique used
by the various states. From each group
in the table, a representative statute has
been selected for more detailed descrip-
tion.
TECHNIQUES OF DEFINING OBSCENITY IN THE VARIOUS STATES
No Definition
Alabama'
Arkansas
Idaho
Kentucky
Maryland
Massachusetts
Montana 2
North Dakota
South Dakota
Multiple
Synonym
Alaska -
Delaware
Florida
Hawaii 4
Indiana
Maine
Missouri
Tendency to
Corrupt Youth
Hawaii 4
Iowa
Rhode Island
Texas
Wyoming
Washington
Wisconsin
1 Nude pictures in art galleries are exempt
from prohibition.
2 Forbids sale to minors only.
3 Restricts comic books only.
4 Uses both multiple synonym and tendency to
corrupt youth.
Tendency to Corrupt
Public Morals
Colorado
Vermont
West Virginia
Roth Rule
Arizona
California
Connecticut 5
Georgia
Illinois
Kansas
Louisiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York6
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah 7
, Prohibits articles nonmailable under federal
law.
6 Considers presentation of material and man-
ner of sale.
7 Defines community.
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The Wisconsin Statute - No
Definition
The present Wisconsin obscenity stat-
ute side-steps the problem of defining ob-
scenity by not defining it at all. The
statute, Section 944.21, reads:
LEWD, OBSCENE OR INDECENT
MATTER, PICTURES AND PER-
FORMANCES. (1) Whoever inten-
tionally does any of the following may
be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than 5 years or both:
(a) Imports, prints, advertises, sells,
has in his possession for sale, or pub-
lishes, exhibits, or transfers commercially
any lewd, obscene or indecent written
matter, picture, sound recording, or film;
or
(b) Has in his possession any lewd,
obscene or indecent sound recording or
motion picture film; or
(c) Has in his possession, with intent
to transfer or exhibit to a person under
the age of 18 years, any matter prohibited
by this section; or
(d) Advertises, produces or performs
in any lewd, obscene or indecent per-
formance.
(2) Whoever requires, as a condition to
the purchase of periodicals, that a retailer
accept material known by the distributor
to be lewd, obscene or indecent may be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than 5 years or both.
By not defining "lewdness," "obscen-
ity" or "indecency," this statute escapes
the fate of the specific definition in the
1957 Michigan statute, which was struck
down as not in keeping with the court's
concept of constitutionality. The statute,
however, lacks any concrete criteria for
judging such "lewd, obscene or indecent"
materials, leaving the courts to set stand-
ards. Also, it may be open to charges of
vagueness. In the past, the Supreme
Court struck down a statute which made
it a crime to distribute literature so
massed as to incite violence and depravity
(Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 523
(1948)) and a statute which prohibited
"sacrilege" (Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952)) because as Justice Reed
stated in Winters, "Where a statute is so
vague as to make criminal an innocent
act, a conviction under it cannot be sus-
tained." Under such a standard it is pos-
sible that the words "obscene" and "in-
decent" may eventually come under at-
tack on this ground.
The Florida Example- Definition
by Multiple Synonyms
Some states, in an effort to specify the
meaning of obscene, have defined obscene
by using numerous synonyms.
The Florida statute offers a good ex-
ample of this type. Section 847.011
states:
Prohibition of certain acts in connection
with obscene, lewd, etc., materials; penalty
(1) (a) A person who knowingly sells,
lends, gives away, distributes, transmits,
shows or transmutes, or offers to sell,
lend, give away, distribute, transmit,
show or transmute, or has in his pos-
session, custody, or control with intent
to sell, lend, give away, distribute, trans-
mit, show, transmute, or advertise in any
manner, any obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, indecent, immoral, sadistic, or
masochistic book, magazine, periodical,
pamphlet, newspaper, comic book, story
paper, written or printed story or article,
writing, paper, card, picture, drawing,
photograph, motion picture film, figure,
image, phonograph record, or wire or tape
or other recording, or any written, printed,
or recorded matter of any such character
which may or may not require mechanical
or other means to be transmuted into
auditory, visual, or sensory representations
of such character, or any article or in-
strument of indecent or immoral use, or
purporting to be for indecent or im-
moral use or purpose; or who knowingly
designs, copies, draws, photographs, poses
for, writes, prints, publishes, or in any,
manner whatsoever manufactures or pre-,
pares any such material, matter, article,
or thing of any such character; or who
knowingly writes, prints, publishes, or
utters, or causes to be written, printed,
published, or uttered, any advertisement
or notice of any kind, giving information,
directly or indirectly, stating, or purport-
ing to state, where, how, of whom, or
by what means any, or what purports to
be any, such material, matter, article, or
thing of any such character can be pur-
chased, obtained, or had; or who in any
manner knowingly hires, employs, uses,
or permits any person to do or assist in
doing, either knowingly or innocently, any
act or thing mentioned above, is guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year or by fine not exceed-
ing $1,000.00, or both.
Although this technique certainly accen-
tuates obscene, it does not seem to clarify
its meaning. What is gained through
dramatic emphasis, is lost in readability.
The initial list of actions, the long list of
synonyms for obscene, and the long list
of matter which is to be included result
in a very cumbersome and confusing
statute.
Iowa - The Hicklin Test
Whereas the preceding example de-
scribed matter which was obscene on its
face, this and the following tests relate
to the material's effect on a reader. The
Iowa statute contains the test found in
Hicklin, supra, banning matter a portion
of which would tend to corrupt the cor-
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ruptible, particularly the young. Section
725.4 of the Iowa Statutes states:
If any person imports, prints, publishes,
sells or distributes books, pamphlets,
ballads, or any printed or written paper
containing any obscene language tending
to corrupt morals of youth, or buys, pro-
cures, receives or has in his possession
any such material spoken of above, he
shall be imprisoned for not more than
one year or fined not more than $1,000.
The Michigan statute which used the
same test was declared unconstitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in
1957 (see Butler v. Michigan, supra).
Colorado - Corrupting the
Public Morals
The Colorado statute prohibits distri-
bution of obscene, lewd, or indecent mat-
ter "directed to the prurient interest to
corrupt morals." Section 40-9-17 (1) of
the Colorado Statutes states:
Exhibiting, selling, or possessing ob-
scene books - penalty. - (1) Whoever
knowingly exhibits, lends, gives away,
sells, or offers to exhibit, lend, give away,
or sell, or in any manner publishes, or
offers to publish, or has in his possession,
for any such purpose, any obscene, lewd,
or indecent, or lascivious book, pamphlet,
paper, drawing, print, picture, writing,
advertisement, circular, or other repre-
sentation, figure, or image, on, or of
paper or other material; or any cast, in-
strument, or other article of an immoral
or indecent nature; or any drug, or
medicine or instrument for procuring
abortion, or for self-pollution; or any
newspaper, or magazine, containing pic-
tures of men or women in indecent atti-
tudes or positions, or which publishes, by
pictures or descriptions, indecent or im-
moral details of crime, vice, or immorality,
to corrupt public morals, or to offend
common decency, or to make vice and
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crime, immorality and licentiousness at-
tractive, or advertises the same for sale;
or writes, or prints, or causes to be sold,
or written, or printed, any card, circular,
letter, handbill, book, pamphlet, advertise-
ment, or notice thereof, of any kind; or
gives information orally, or otherwise,
stating when, where, how, or of whom or
by what means any of the articles or
things hereinbefore mentioned can be pur-
chased or otherwise obtained, or are
manufactured, or published; or manufac-
tures, draws, or prints, or in any wise
makes, with intent to exhibit, sell, lend, or
give away, or have exhibited, sold, loaned,
or given away, any such articles or things,
which are directed to the prurient interest
to corrupt morals, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof,
shall be fined not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than two thousand dol-
lars with costs of court, and imprisoned
in the county jail for not less than one
month, nor more than one year. Nothing
in sections 40-9-17 to 40-9-19 shall be
construed to affect teaching in regularly
chartered medical colleges, or the publi-
cation, sale, and use of standard medical
books, or the practice of regular practi-
tioners of medicine, or druggists in their
legitimate business.
This statute again is cumbersome.
However, the tendency to corrupt public
morals or to offend common decency is a
definition similar to the Roth definition
of "patently offensive to the average
member of the community."
The Michigan Law - Incorporating
Roth into the Statute
The present Michigan statute is an ex-
ample of the most recent trend in the
drafting of obscenity statutes: the incor-
poration of all or portions of the Roth
definition into the statutory test for ob-
scenity. Already, 23 states have adopted
this definition. The Michigan statute
takes its definition almost verbatim from
the Roth decision. Section 28.575 (2)
of the Michigan Statutes states:
§ 28.575 (2) Test applied to determine
obscenity of book, picture or object.
SEC. 343b. The test to be applied in
cases under section 343a of this act shall
not be whether sexual desires or sexually
improper thoughts would be aroused in
those comprising a particular segment of
the community, the young, the immature
or the highly prudish, or would leave
another segment, the scientific or highly
educated or the so-called worldly wise and
sophisticated, indifferent and unmoved.
But such test shall be the effect of the
book, picture or other subject to com-
plaint considered as a whole, not upon
any particular class, but upon all those
whom it is likely to reach, that is, its
impact upon the average person in the
community. The book, picture or other
subject of complaint must be judged as
a whole in its entire context, not by con-
sidering detached or separate portions
only, and by the standards of common
conscience of the community of the con-
temporary period of the violation charged.
The ambiguity in Roth which plagues the
courts is also troublesome in drafting
statutes. Utah adopted the Roth stand-
ard but, in an attempt at a more precise
meaning, sought to define community as
the community of the State of Utah.
(Utah Statutes, 76-39-11.)
OTHER SUGGESTED
DEFINITIONS
Definition Relating to Sales
In keeping with the recent judicial em-
phasis on manner of sale is the New
York State statute relating to prohibited
publication. The general obscenity stat-
ute for New York uses the Roth defini-
tion. However, the section dealing spe-
cifically with publication prohibits pub-
lication of matter specifically designed to
exploit prurient interest commercially.
Section 1141 (5) of the New York Stat-
ute states:
5. The publication for sale of any
book, magazine or pamphlet designed,
composed or illustrated as a whole to ap-
peal to and commercially exploit prurient
interest by combining covers, pictures,
drawings, illustrations, caricatures, car-
toons, words, stories and advertisements
or any combination or combinations
thereof devoted to the description, por-
trayal or deliberate suggestion of illicit
sex, including adultery, prostitution,
fornication, sexual crime and sexual
perversion or to the exploitation of sex
and nudity by the presentation of nude
or partially nude female figures, posed,
photographed or otherwise presented in a
manner calculated to provoke or incite
prurient interest, or any combination or
combinations thereof, shall be a violation
of this section.
Defining Criteria for Judging
Obscenity
In 1960, the Council for Independent
Distribution, Merchandise Mart Plaza,
Chicago, published a draft model obscen-
ity statute, which was primarily concerned
with the process by which matter would
be judged obscene. Among the suggested
laws relating to the process of adjudging
such materials was a section devoted to
the type of evidence to be considered in
a decision of this type. Section 6 (2) of
this model draft lists these pertinent areas
as
(a) the class of persons comprising the
audience to which the printed matter is
primarily directed by its nature and the
manner of its publication, advertisement,
distribution, and sale;
(b) the effect of the printed matter,
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considered as a whole, upon the sexual
behavior of readers typical of the class
of persons to whom the printed matter is
primarily directed;
(c) the artistic, literary, scientific, and
educational values of the printed matter,
considered as a whole; and
(d) the intent of the author and pub-
lisher in writing and publishing the print-
ed matter.
Section 7. (1) In making a decision
on the obscenity of the printed matter,
the district court shall consider, among
other things, each of the matter specified
in Section 6 (2) and shall include a
written determination on each matter
either in his findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law or in a memorandum ac-
companying them.
This type of statute would not define
the obscene, leaving the definition com-
pletely up to the court, but it would de-
fine the criteria which the court must
consider in arriving at its decision.
Restricting Sale Only to Minors
The Montana law on obscenity restricts
sale of obscene materials only to minors.
Section 94-3601 states:
94-3601. (11134) Obscene literature
not to be given to or sold by minors.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to sell,
lend, give away, distribute, resell, or re-
distribute, show, or have in his posses-
sion with intent to sell, give away, dis-
tribute, resell, or redistribute, or to show
or advertise or otherwise offer for loan,
gift, or distribution, to any minor child,
under the age of eighteen (18) years,
any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspa-
per, lewd picture, story paper, so-called
comic book, or other printed, mimeo-
graphed or published matter, devoted to
the publication or principally made up of
criminal news, police reports, or accounts
of criminal deeds, or pictures and stories
of lust or crime, or portraying sexually
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indecent conduct or subject-matter, or
portraying the planning or committing of
deeds of crime, violence, horror, brutal-
ity, immorality or vice. It shall be un-
lawful to exhibit upon any street or high-
way, or in any place within the view of
any minor child under the age of eigh-
teen (18) years, or to hire, use, employ,
or permit such child to sell or give away
or in any manner distribute any such
book, pamphlet, magazine, lewd picture,
newspaper, story paper, so-called comic
book or publication or other printed,
mimeographed, or published matter above
described.
(2) The prohibitions and penalties im-
posed hereby shall not extend to pub-
lications within any constitutional guar-
antee of freedom of the press or freedom
of religious worship, nor to publications
privileged for medical instruction, privi-
leged as official law enforcement bulle-
tins or publications, nor to publications
or reproductions of bona fide works of
literature and the fine arts.
Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting
opinion in the Winters case, considered
this to be one of the statutes throughout
the country that would fall under the ma-
jority decision in the case as "void for
vagueness." (Winters v. New York,
supra.) The vagueness here concerned
the description of the types of material
prohibited, that is, those dealing with
violence, etc. However, since this restric-
tion was placed only on materials sold to
minors, it would appear to be in keeping
with the court's decision in the Butler v.
Michigan case, supra.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
WISCONSIN STATUTE
Early Definitions
The first Wisconsin law prohibiting ob-
scene literature was enacted prior to
statehood and is found as Chapter 139,
Section 11, in the first Wisconsin Statutes
in 1849. It prohibited the sale or distri-
bution of printed matter described as
"manifestly tending to the corruption of
the morals of youth." This definition re-
mained on the statute books until 1941.
At that time, Chapter 322, Laws of
1941, was enacted to delete "manifestly"
and "of youth." The statute now de-
scribed the materials prohibited as "tend-
ing to the corruption of the morals."
This description remained in the statutes
until the first revision of the Criminal
Code was devised in 1953.
The 1953 revision made the first statu-
tory attempt to prescribe an actual def-
inition of obscenity. The statute used the
word "lewd" rather than "obscene" and
defined materials possessing "lewdness"
as being those in which the "dominant
effect of the thing, taken as a whole, is
one of sexual obscenity." According to
the Legislative Council's note accompany-
ing this section, the definition was taken
from the opinion of Judge Augustus
Hand in United States v. One Book en-
titled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934). The stated purpose
of the council in inserting this definition
was to do away with the difficulty experi-
enced under statutes, like the old section,
which had been held to bar genuine
works of literature written not for ob-
scene purposes, but to portray certain
events or classes of people realistically.
The note further stated that "by this
standard there would be no question that
a scientific work on physiology or a de-
cently written marriage manual is not
lewd literature. On the other hand, lewd-
ness cannot be diluted by putting it in
with something which is acceptable. For
example, a lewd picture on the cover of
a book is not saved by the fact that the
story inside is decent; a lewd passage in
a book which has no relation to the work
as a whole is prohibited." The purpose
of the new definition was to exclude
"legitimate works of literature, art, or
science by use of more definite language."
Whether or not this definition would have
accomplished these objectives was not de-
termined, however, because the code did
not become effective in its 1953 form.1
The 1955 Code deleted the definition
and simply prohibited any printed matter
which was "lewd, obscene or indecent."
The Criminal Code Advisory Committee
minutes for March 26, 1955, reported
the reasoning behind the deletion of the
definition as follows:
After lengthy discussion concerning the
definition of "lewd and obscene", which
Mr. Remington said was a very substan-
tial change in the law that would require
the expurgation of about 1/3 of the
books on library shelves, and which he
felt would meet with serious opposition
on the part of publishers. Mr. Bard-
well moved that the definition of "lewd
and obscene" be stricken from Sections
344.21, 344.215 and 344.216 of the
Code, so that the Code does not con-
tain a definition of those words. Mr.
Myers seconded the motion and the mo-
tion was carried.
Mr. Hughes then moved that said three
sections be amended by changing the
words "lewd and obscene" wherever they
appear to be "lewd, obscene or indecent".
Judge Goodland seconded the motion,
'The Code enacted by the 1953 Legislature
was not to be adopted until the Criminal Code
Advisory Committee had submitted amend-
ments to the 1955 Legislature. One of the
amendments changed this section.
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and the motion was carried.
This is the present status of the Wiscon-
sin obscenity statute. The problem of
defining obscene continues to plague the
Legislature.
Legislation Considered in
Wisconsin
In the 1965 session, 3 bills introduced
were concerned with some modification
of the use of obscene. Senate Bill 340
related to a definition for the general ob-
scenity section. Senate Bills 26 and 102
related to a definition limited to sale to
minors.
Senate Bill 340 was drafted for Sena-
tor Gordon Roseleip. Drafting instructions
were submitted by the American Legion.
A resolution of the Legion at its 1964
state convention expressed uneasiness at
the lack of definition for obscenity in the
Wisconsin Statutes. It suggested that the
statute be amended to include the defini-
tion of obscenity found in Webster's Dic-
tionary. This definition would be: "'Ob-
scene' means offensive to chastity of mind
or to modesty; expressing or presenting
to the mind or view something that deli-
cateness, purity and decency forbid to be
exposed; lewd; or indecent." This def-
inition is different from the others in that
it describes the nonobscene as well as the
obscene. The bill was tabled. There was
no roll call vote on it.
Senate Bill 26, introduced by Senator
Leonard et al., related only to sale and
distribution to minors. It prohibits ma-
terial which is "lewd, obscene or indecent
• .. and exploits .. . illicit sex or sexual
immorality . . . nude figures posed or
presented in a manner to provoke or
arouse lust or passion or to exploit sex,
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lust or perversion for commercial gain."
The bill also stated that the Legislature
found the above described materials to
be "completely without social value and
• . . obscene for persons under 18 years
of age." The pandering principle-that
is, the commercial exploitation of pruri-
ent interest-is also alluded to in pro-
hibiting exploitation of illicit sex or sex-
ual immorality. The bill was withdrawn
by the authors, who were also the au-
thors of Senate Bill 102.
Only one bill was passed in the house
of introduction and sent to the other
house. That was Senate Bill 102. As
this bill was amended a number of times
in each house, it offers examples of sev-
eral types of definitions. Using the
synonym method, the bill as introduced
defined obscene materials as those which
were obscene, lewd, lascivious, porno-
graphic or indecent.
Substitute Amendment 1, S., to the
bill supplied a definition that "obscenity
is the present critical point in the com-
promise between candor and shame at
which the community has arrived here
and now." The definition would apply
the present community standards doctrine
from Roth and was originally used by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119. This amend-
ment was rejected in the Senate. There
was no roll call vote.
Substitute Amendment 2, S., added a
stipulation that it be unlawful "to send
or receive by any public or commercial
vehicle or conveyance, within the state,
any matter which is unmailable under
U.S. postal regulation, because it is
deemed obscene, lewd, lascivious or
filthy." According to the Wisconsin At-
torney General's opinion (54 OAG 152),
this provision would be unconstitutional
as a violation of Article VII, Section 21,
of the Wisconsin Constitution, because it
did not specify the particular regulations
of the U.S. Post Office to be included.
This amendment was rejected by voice
vote.
Substitute Amendment 3, S., which
passed the Senate, contained both the
definition from Justice Learned Hand and
the stipulation regarding the United States
mails.
In the Assembly further amendments
were proposed and further changes were
made in definition. Substitute Amend-
ment 1, A., would have abandoned the
definition of obscenity as the critical point
beween candor and shame and would
have inserted instead the Roth definition,
that obscenity is material "patently of-
fensive and which predominately appeals
to the prurient interest of the average
person applying contemporary community
standards of decency."
Amendment 1, A., to Substitute
Amendment 1, A., would have deleted
this definition. Substitute Amendment 2,
A., returned to the definition in the
original bill of material "made up of
descriptions of illicit sex or sexual
morality or . . . (of nude figures)
presented in a manner to provoke or
arouse lust or passion or to exploit sex,
lust or perversion or which advertises
services, facilities or articles for sexual
deviation." On this definition the At-
torney General's opinion stated that the
test must be patent offensiveness and
prurient appeal, not whether it portrays
illicit sex, sexual immorality or pro-
vocative nude figures, that similar
definitions had been termed unconstitu-
tional by the New York Court of Appeals.
(People v. The Book Case, Inc., 14 N.Y.
2d 409 (1964).)
The most descriptive definition of
obscenity was in Section 5 of Substitute
Amendment 3, A.
(a) "Minor" means any person under
the age of 18 years.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of
the human male or female genitals, pub-
ic area or buttocks with less than a fully
opaque covering, or the showing of the
female breast with less than a fully
opaque covering or any portion thereof
below the top of the areola or the depic-
tion of covered male genitals in a dis-
cernibly turgid state.
(c) "Sexual conduct" means acts of
masturbation, homosexuality, sexual in-
tercourse or physical contact with a per-
son's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic
area, buttocks or, if such person be a
female, breast, which contact is made as
an act of sexual stimulation or grati-
fication.
(d) "Sexual excitement" means the
condition of human male or female gen-
itals when in a state of sexual stimulation
or arousal.
(e) "Sadomasochistic abuse" means
flagellation or torture by or upon a per-
son clad in undergarments, a mask or
bizarre costume, or the condition of be-
ing fettered, bound or otherwise physical-
ly restrained on the part of one so
clothed.
(f) "Harmful to minors" means that
quality of any description or representa-
tion, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomaso-
chistic abuse, when it:
1. Predominately appeals to the pruri-
ent, shameful or morbid interest of min-
ors, and
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2. Is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable
material for minors, and
3. Is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors.
(g) "Knowingly" means having knowl-
edge of both:
1. The character and content of any
material described in this section, or
failure to exercise reasonable inspection
which would disclose the character and
content of the material, but an honest
and bona fide mistake shall constitute an
excuse to liability under this section.
Whether inspection is reasonable shall be
determined by considering the size of the
merchant's business, the character of his
books and clientele, the number of his
employees, and any other variable factor
which might affect his ability to inspect
without limiting his merchandise. Proof
that a defendant had knowledge of the
obscene character and content of the ma-
terial may be made by showing that the
material had been adjudicated obscene in
a prior proceeding under S. 269.565 and
notice of such adjudication had been giv-
en in writing to the defendant; and
2. The age of the minor, but an hon-
est mistake shall constitute an excuse
from liability hereunder if the defendant
made a reasonable bona fide attempt to
ascertain the true age of such minor.
Although votes were taken on several
amendments to Substitute Amendment 3,
A., none of these related to the definition
sections. There were no votes on the 3
Assembly substitute amendments. The
bill was finally referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary.
CONCLUSION
None of the bills defining obscenity
were enacted by the 1965 Wisconsin
Legislature, and the question continues to
(Continued on page 170)
before the public eye would be subject
to even a greater privilege, perhaps even
an absolute one, protecting statements
about him which might otherwise violate
his right of privacy. Thus, even on a
showing of actual malice, no redress would
be afforded a public official in a right of
privacy action.
13 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1967
As noted, many questions concerning
defamation and privacy actions remain
unanswered. Answers will come; Time,
Inc. v. Hill is but one of the building
blocks as the Supreme Court measures the
communication torts by the guarantees of
the first amendment.
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(Continued)
be debated. Presently, the Wisconsin
Statutes uses "lewd, obscene and in-
decent" without defining them, leaving the
definition to the courts. By its decision
in State v. Chobot, 12 Wis. 2d 110
(1960) and McCauley v. Tropic of Can-
cer, 20 Wis. 2d 132 (1963), the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has defined the
statutory term "obscenity" as equivalent
to the Roth definition and has required
the Roth standard for judging materials
obscene. Thus, obscenity is defined in
ST. THOMAS MORE
(Continued)
tyranny, More said: "You must pardon
me from passing as you pass, but if I
thought in the matter as you do, I dare
not in such a matter pass for good com-
pany. For the passage of my soul passes
accordance with the United States
Supreme Court's view of a constitutional
definition.
The prevailing view of the United
States Supreme Court is based on the
Roth decision. The present majority
interpretation is that the Roth standard
includes 3 specifications: 1) the dom-
inant theme on the whole appeals to the
prurient interest, 2) it is patently offen-
sive to present community standards, and
3) it contains no redeeming social value.
all good company."
In the final analysis, More is the con-
temporary man because he is the type of
man we need. A man willing to make
his own frightening judgments. A man.
